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Since July 2004 the job search effort of long-term unemployed benefit claimants is monitored 
in Belgium. We exploit the discontinuity in the treatment assignment at the age of 30 to 
evaluate the effect of a notification sent at least 8 months before job search is verified. The 
threat of monitoring increases transitions to employment, but of lower quality. In the less 
prosperous region, Wallonia, the impact is smaller, despite of the presence of specific 
counseling for the notified workers, and more heterogeneous. Moreover, in this region, the 
threat induces women to substitute sickness for unemployment benefits. 
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* This paper is a thorough revision of an earlier version (Cockx and Dejemeppe, 2007). The major 
change concerns the outcome variables, since, in contrast to the previous paper, we can now identify 
employment and other destination states for which unemployment is left. In addition, this paper 
contains some methodological contributions regarding discontinuity design with a grouped continuous 
forcing variable. Conclusions also differ in major respects. 1 Introduction
The provision of Unemployment Insurance (UI) involves a trade-off between insurance and
work incentives. Many economic researchers have studied how limiting the coverage of
UI and the duration of beneﬁt entitlement can restore work incentives (see e.g. Lalive et
al., 2006). However, most UI schemes also provide work incentives by imposing job search
requirements amongst others1 on beneﬁt claimants. Boone et al. (2007) argue that such re-
quirements, enforced by monitoring and sanctions, may deliver the right incentives by im-
posing less costs than the aforementioned alternatives. This paper is about the impact of the
introduction of such a monitoring scheme in Belgian UI in 2004.
In most countries2 job search requirements are implemented as a sequence of regular face-
to-face interviews in which caseworkers monitor job search methods and employer contacts
reported by the beneﬁt claimant. The claimant who is detected not to comply with the rules
or with an individual agreement drawn up at an earlier meeting may be sanctioned, usu-
ally in the form of a temporary beneﬁt reduction. The new scheme that was introduced in
Belgium shares these general features, but was particular in that the monitoring interviews
did not start early in the unemployment spell, as in many countries, but were targeted on
the long-term unemployed claiming beneﬁts for more than 21 months.3 A consequence of
this timing is that the beneﬁt claimant may anticipate the monitoring interview and change
her (job search) behavior beforehand. In this study we focus on this “threat effect” (Black et
al., 2003) of job search monitoring by analyzing the impact of a written notiﬁcation sent to
beneﬁt claimants several months before the interview.
This focus is relevant, since in the presence of threat effects a monitoring scheme does not
only affect the population attending the interviews. Consequently, if one neglects these ef-
fects, the impact of such a scheme may be underestimated. Moreover, if threat effects are
important, this also has consequences for the design of the monitoring scheme. For it sug-
gests that one can save on caseworker personnel costs by not starting with monitoring inter-
views immediately after the intake in unemployment, but later on, so that there is time for
the threat effect to realize.
The reform in Belgium is implemented differently according to the region of living. In Wal-
1Most common other requirements are to be registered as job seeker, to be available for work and to partici-
pate in training or work experience programs.
2See OECD (2007) for an international comparison of monitoring schemes.
3For youth aged less than 25 years this threshold was set at 15 months. Since this study focuses on beneﬁt
claimants aged 30, we will describe in the sequel only the regulations that apply to this age group.
1lonia, the French speaking region in the South of the country, the notiﬁed unemployed are
invited to counseling interviews within two months after dispatch of the notiﬁcation.4 This
means that we identify in this region the combined effect of notiﬁcation and counseling. By
contrast, in Flanders, the Flemish speaking region in the North, the notiﬁed group is not
systematically counseled, so that we identify in this region the pure threat effect induced by
the notiﬁcation.
The analysis is based on rich administrative data, which do not only allow to identify the
impact on the job ﬁnding rate, but also on the quality of employment in terms of its start-
ing wage and duration, and on exits to training and out of the labor force, including sick-
ness beneﬁts. A discontinuity design (DD), resulting from the gradual phasing in of the
new monitoring scheme by age group, identiﬁes these effects under weak assumptions
(Thistlethwaite and Campbell, 1960; Hahn et al., 2001; Lee and Lemieux, 2009). Between
July 2004 and June 2005 the job search requirements were only imposed on beneﬁt claimants
younger than 30 years on July 1, 2004. In the following years the older age groups were
gradually integrated. This study exploits the discontinuity in the treatment assignment at
the age of 30. Since the discontinuity disappears after a year, we can only identify the threat
effect of notiﬁcation and not the ex post effects of the monitoring interviews.
The DD inference is slightly complicated by the measurement of age in monthly intervals.
By this grouping of the forcing variable no data are available in a close neighborhood around
the discontinuity which makes non-parametric estimation of the treatment effect infeasible.
The chosen functional form for the relationship between the outcome of interest and age is
thus subject to a speciﬁcation error. Lee and Card (2008) provide a solution to this problem
for the case of a discrete forcing variable. In this research we adjust this solution for a grouped
continuous forcing variable, such as age, and discuss the interest of such an adjustment. In
addition, we propose a goodness-of-ﬁt test for the chosen functional form that explicitly
takes the aforementioned speciﬁcation error into account.
The outline of the article is as follows. In the next section we describe the institutional setting
and the features of the new monitoring scheme. In Section 3 we review the literature and
the theoretical predictions of job search theory. Section 4 describes the data. The estimation
method, focusing on the methodological contribution of this research, is presented in Section
5. Section 6 reports the treatment effects on various outcomes and contains a number of
validity checks. A ﬁnal section concludes.
4A similar procedure applies to Brussels, but this region is not retained in the analysis, since the available
sample is to small.
22 Institutional setting
2.1 Before the 2004 reform
Belgium is a federal state that has decentralized certain competencies to the regional level.
UI is organized at the federal level. It pays out unemployment beneﬁts (UB) and issues sanc-
tions if the unemployed don’t comply with the rules. The Public Employment Services (PES)
are organized at the regional level. They are in charge of job search assistance, intermedia-
tion services and training of unemployed and employed workers.
In Belgium a worker is entitled to UI in two instances:5 (i) after graduation from school
conditional on a waiting period of 9 months;6 (ii) after involuntary dismissal from a sufﬁ-
ciently long-lasting job.7 In contrast to many other countries the beneﬁt entitlement does
not exhaust after a certain duration.8 School-leavers are entitled to ﬂat rate beneﬁts while
dismissed workers earn a gross replacement rate ranging between 40% and 60% of past earn-
ings, which is bracketed by a ﬂoor and a cap. The beneﬁt level depends on household type
(head of household, cohabitant or single) and on unemployment duration for dismissed sin-
gles and cohabitants.
Sanctions could be imposed for not complying to administrative rules: (i) making a false
declaration (e.g. with regards the household type or an undeclared employment relation-
ship) or (ii) being unavailable for the labor market (not registered as a job searcher at the
regional PES, not turning up at an appointment in the PES or UI agency, refusing a ’suitable’
job offer or refusing job search assistance or participation in a training program, etc.). Before
the reform in 2004, roughly 80% of the monitoring reports regarding availability concerned
not turning up at an appointment (RVA, 2006, p. 72). Job search was not monitored at that
time.
Job seekers may on their own initiative make free of charge use of the services provided by
the regional PES. Aside of this, before the 2004 reform only the Flemish PES was following-
up all registered job seekers systematically. Inspired by the ﬁrst European guidelines for
employment, job seekers were invited to a meeting with a counselor a few months9 after the
initial registration. Depending on the outcome of this meeting, an action plan was drawn
up and followed up. In Brussels and Wallonia such systematic counseling was targeted to
5See www.onem.be for more information.
6This waiting period lasts only 6 months for those aged less than 18 years and 12 months for youth between
26 and 30.
7The length of the contribution period depends on age.
8There existed an exception for cohabitants living with a partner earning a sufﬁciently high income (Cockx
and Ries, 2004). However, this scheme was abolished together with the 2004 reform.
9In 2004 this occurred after 3 to 4 months for unemployed younger than 25 and for the older after 9 months.
3low-skilled youth aged less than 25 only.
2.2 The 2004 reform
The most essential feature of the 2004 reform was the introduction of a job search monitor-
ing scheme. The monitoring procedure consists in several steps:10 a notiﬁcation and up to
three face-to-face interviews. The notiﬁcation is sent by mail and states that one is required
to actively search for a job and to participate in any action proposed by the regional PES.
Some examples of search methods are provided and it is clearly stated that one should col-
lect written proofs of the undertaken search actions. The letter announces that one will be
invited at the UI ofﬁce to evaluate the undertaken actions and that this interview will take
place at the moment that the unemployment duration attains 21 months, i.e. not earlier than
eight months later (since the letter is sent after 13 months). The letter also mentions that one
should contact the regional PES if one has not yet been individually counseled. Finally, a
folder explaining the different steps of the monitoring procedure is enclosed.
Interviews last approximately half an hour. At each interview the undertaken search actions
are evaluated. If search effort at the ﬁrst meeting is deemed insufﬁcient an action plan is
drawn up. If at the next meeting four months later it is established that the worker does not
fulﬁll the plan, a second, stricter action plan is imposed and beneﬁts are temporarily (possi-
bly partially) withdrawn. If, again four months later, at the third meeting the worker does
not comply, beneﬁts are completely withdrawn and the worker can regain entitlement only
after being full-time employed during at least one year. After a positive evaluation at the
ﬁrst (second) meeting, a new sequence of meetings is scheduled 12 (16) months later. This
contrasts quite starkly with the frequency of monitoring in many other countries: half of
OECD countries require reporting of job search (in most cases) every two weeks or at least
monthly (OECD, 2007).
Job search effort is evaluated on the basis of proofs delivered by the unemployed worker
(copies of letters of application, registration in temporary help agencies, proofs of participa-
tion in selection procedures, etc.). Regulations don’t specify, however, a minimum number
of employer contacts to submit. Consequently, caseworkers have quite some discretion in
the evaluation process. This discretion together with the fact that in the beginning phase of
the reform no information was available on the evaluation practice could explain why such
a relatively loose monitoring scheme from an international perspective could cause the im-
portant threat effects reported in the empirical analysis.
The 2004 reform did not only concern monitoring of job search. The supply of the services
10See Cockx et al. (2007) and Cockx and Dejemeppe (2007) for more details.
4provided by the regional PES was signiﬁcantly enhanced in all three regions. In Flanders this
increase was essentially allocated to expand existing services. By contrast, in Brussels and
Wallonia the PES gradually introduced a systematic follow-up scheme as the one that was al-
ready operating in Flanders. In addition, speciﬁc counseling was targeted on the population
concerned by the monitoring scheme. Within two months of receipt of the aforementioned
notiﬁcation, unemployed beneﬁt claimants are invited to a collective information meeting at
the PES.At this meetingthe monitoring procedureand the servicesof the PESare elucidated.
Soon after this meeting an individual face-to-face interview takes place and, if necessary, an
action plan is drawn up, which could result in job search assistance or training.
3 Literature review and theoretical predictions
According to standard job search theory11 the threat of being sanctioned if job search effort
is insufﬁcient results in more search effort and thereby speeds up the transition to employ-
ment. At the same time, monitoring will make the worker less selective so that she may
accept jobs of lower quality. These effects realize as soon as the worker is informed about
the monitoring scheme in place.
Monitoring need not always enhance the job ﬁnding rate, however. First, van den Berg and
van der Klaauw (2006) argue that only formal proofs of job search can be veriﬁed. In an ex-
tended job search model they demonstrate that monitoring may then substitute informal by
formal job search, so that the total job search intensity may hardly change or even decline.
This effect would, however, be less relevant for the long-term unemployed, on whom we
focus in this research, since the informal search channels are likely to have “dried up” after
a long spell of inactivity. Second, Manning (2009) shows that the imposition of stricter job
search requirements does not enhance search incentives for all workers, since, if behavior
is followed-up too closely, workers may ﬁnd it too onerous to continue claiming beneﬁts
and may withdraw from the labor force instead. However, this argument must be qualiﬁed
here. Since it’s costly to forgo the UB, it is unlikely that such withdrawals occur before the
moment at which the monitoring interview takes place, unless the unemployed can qualify
for other beneﬁts of comparable level. In Belgium, there is an incentive to transit to sickness
insurance (and to disability insurance subsequently, after 6 months), since the beneﬁt level
corresponds to that of UI. Entitlement to sickness beneﬁts requires a doctor’s certiﬁcate and
is, in principle, veriﬁed by an independent physician.
If monitoring is combined with counseling and if the latter is effective, the job arrival rate
will increase even further and the impact on the job ﬁnding rate will be even stronger.12
11See e.g. Mortensen (1986).
12In principle the job ﬁnding rate could decrease if the indirect effect via the effect on the reservation wage
5In contrast, unless workers dislike it (Black et al., 2003), counseling raises the reservation
wage, so that the net effect of the combined program on the quality of employment is in-
determinate. In addition, counseling may enhance transitions into training and discourage
withdrawals from the labor force.
The U.K. Restart unemployment program introduced in April 1987 shares a number of the
features of the monitoring scheme introduced in Belgium: (i) it is targeted to long-term un-
employed workers although of shorter duration (6 months); (ii) it starts with a dispatch of a
letter; (iii) it continues with regular interviews (every 6 months); (iv) as in Wallonia (but not
in Flanders), it consists of a combination of counseling and tighter enforcement of eligibility
conditions. Dolton and O’Neill (1996, 2002) evaluate this program. On the basis of exper-
imental evidence they conclude the following: (i) the program reduces the time spent in
unemployment in the short run for both men and women, but in the long run only for men;
(ii) the threat of monitoring is responsible for the short run effect, whereas counseling for the
long-run effect; (iii) the program is more likely to induce men to leave unemployment for a
job, while for women it encourages retreat from the labor force. Some of these conclusions
are conﬁrmed in our empirical analysis.
Other researchers13 report that schemes that combine tighter enforcement with counseling
stimulate the transition from unemployment to work, but could not identify which of the
two components contributed to this success. Researchers who have studied the impact of
job search monitoring in isolation mostly ﬁnd that the duration of beneﬁt claim is reduced,14
but not necessarily that transitions to employment increase, as predicted by basic job search
theory. Borland and Tseng (2007) ﬁnd that enhanced monitoring of job search in Australia
signiﬁcantly increases exits from paid unemployment, but their study could not identify the
exit destination. Studies of Johnson and Klepinger (1994) in the U.S. and McVicar (2008)
in Northern Ireland demonstrate that monitoring increases transitions to work. According
to Johnson and Klepinger this effect is not long-lasting, however, since after one year the
probability of employment is no longer signiﬁcantly different between treated and controls.
In contrast, Klepinger et al. (2002) report that tightening work-search requirements slightly
decreases employment and earnings. This is in line with the evidence of Petrongolo (2008)
that enhanced requirements in the UK reduce transitions from unemployment to work, the
number of weeks worked and earnings during about 3 years after job loss. Finally, only two
dominates. Under weak restrictions on the wage offer distribution this possibility is not relevant (van den Berg
and van der Klaauw, 2006).
13See Meyer (1995) for a summary of experimental evidence in the US and Gorter and Kalb (1996) and van
den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006) in the Netherlands.
14Ashenfelter et al. (2005) ﬁnd insigniﬁcant effects, but Klepinger et al. (2002, p.19) claim that the discrepancy
with their conclusions is essentially caused by the smaller sample size of Ashenfelter et al.’s study, resulting in
less precision.
6studies document the effect on withdrawals from the labor market. Petrongolo reports that
the UK reform increased transitions to incapacity beneﬁts. McVicar also ﬁnds evidence that
the suspension of monitoring reduces transitions to ’other beneﬁts’. However, at the same
time workers are more likely to enter training and education.
The delay in the monitoring procedure implies that the imposed job search requirements
may affect the behavior of the beneﬁt claimants before the ﬁrst interview takes place. Such
anticipation effects have been observed and studied before, but not, to our knowledge, the
threat of pure monitoring of job search. On the one hand there is an extensive literature on
the anticipation of the expiration of UI entitlement.15 On the other hand there is a growing
literature that studies the threat effects of (potential) mandatory participation to active labor
market programs (ALMP) or of a pending sanction.16 Both strands of this literature have
shown that such threat effects may form a major share of the total impact of these policies
on the return to employment. Effects on the quality of employment is mixed. Card et al.
(2007), van Ours and Vodopivec (2006) and Lalive et al. (2005) studying the threat effect
of beneﬁt expiration don’t ﬁnd any signiﬁcant effect on wages or subsequent employment
duration. In contrast, a recent study of Caliendo et al. (2009) reveals that workers who leave
unemployment close to the moment of beneﬁt expiration earn signiﬁcantly lower wages
and experience shorter employment spells, and Arni et al. (2009) report that a warning of a
pending sanction reduces earnings, but not employment duration. Finally, the threat effect
on withdrawals from the labor force has hardly been studied. Arni et al. (2009) report that
announcement of a sanction nearly doubles the exit out of the labor force, but this exit is
often only temporary.
4 The Data
We exploit administrative data from several sources: (i) the federal UI agency for monthly
information on UB claims, the new monitoring procedure and the return to regular educa-
tion; (ii) the regional PES for participation in training and job search assistance provided to
the unemployed; (iii) the Crossroads Bank for Social Security17 which matches the aforemen-
tioned information to records of all federal Social Security institutions. These matched data
allowed us to construct monthly indicators of employment (including self-employment) and
starting wage for salaried employment, sickness insurance claims and a residual state (i.e.
neither being employed or UI claimant). This information is available for all sampled indi-
15See e.g. Fredriksson and Holmlund (2006) and Boone and van Ours (2009).
16See Black et al. (2003), Geerdsen (2006), Geerdsen and Holm (2007), Rosholm and Svarer (2008), Graversen
and van Ours (2008) and Rosholm (2008). Arni et al. (2009) study both the ex post effect of a warning of a
pending sanction and the ex ante effect of sanctions.
17See www.ksz-bcss.fgov.be/
7viduals from January 2001 until the end of 2006.
4.1 Sample selection criteria and descriptive statistics
The sample contains all claimants of UB, who on the 1st of July 2004 were between 25 and 34
years old and who became exactly 13 months entitled to UI between May 1 and August 31 of
the same year. For administrative reasons, the duration criterion (13 months) is determined
on the basis of payments made two months before the notiﬁcation is (theoretically) sent.18
To estimate the threat effect of monitoring, we retain only those workers claiming UI for
at least one day during the second month after which unemployment duration attained 13
months, since only to these workers (aged below 30) a notiﬁcation was sent. This dispatch
occurs between July and October 2004.19
In principle all sampled individuals younger than 30 should receive the notiﬁcation. How-
ever, as a consequence of the discrepancy between the moment of data selection (April 2006)
and the actual dispatch of the notiﬁcation (starting in June 2004), a small fraction20 of these
workers is actually not notiﬁed in the month in which they should have been according to
regulations.21 As a consequence, the DD design is “fuzzy”. In section 5 we brieﬂy discuss
the methodological implications.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the sampled population theoretically eligible for the
dispatch of the notiﬁcation letter. In accordance with the subsequent analysis the statistics
are reported separately for Flanders and Wallonia.22 For each of these regions the ﬁrst col-
umnreferstothesampleofunemployedworkersbetween25and29yearsold(the“treated”)
and the second to those aged between 30 and 34 (the “controls”). The data inform about
the following characteristics of the unemployed workers: the starting date of the observa-
tion window corresponding to (potential) dispatch of the notiﬁcation letter (July, August,
September or October 2004), the age reported in years (but measured in months) on the 1st of
July 2004, the gender, the nationality, the level of education, the household-type determining
the UB level (head of household, single or cohabitant), the type of entitlement (school-leaver
or dismissed), an indicator of recent participation in training (including a return to regular
education and job search assistance) and of recent employment experience, both during the
year before sample selection, and the unemployment rate by district of living. Time-varying
18This sample allows therefore to check whether claimants anticipate the notiﬁcation: in that case the exit rate
during these two months would differ between the treatment and control group (see Section 6.1.2).
19To estimate a placebo treatment effect (see Section 6.1.2), we also selected a sample according to exactly the
same sample selection criteria one year earlier, in 2003.
20This fraction is 15%, but in most cases the letter is dispatched a few months later.
21This is essentially a consequence of ex post rectiﬁcations in the administrative data (Cockx and Dejemeppe,
2007).
22Recall that for reasons of too small a sample size, we did not include Brussels in the analysis.
8Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Region of Living and Age Group
Flanders Wallonia
25-29 years 30-34 years 25-29 years 30-34 years
Number of individuals 1 311 1 165 1 310 1 069
Month of (potential) notiﬁcation
July 28.4% 28.8% 27.2% 28.9%
August 25.3% 24.0% 20.8% 22.5%
October 22.7% 24.5% 23.7% 26.0%
November 23.7% 22.8% 28.2% 22.6%
Age
mean age in years on July 1, 2004 26.9 32.0 26.8 32.0
(standard deviation) (1.4) (1.4) (1.4) (1.4)
Sex
women 51.9% 53.1% 45.9% 46.3%
Nationality
Belgian 90.1% 86.8% 90.4% 85.5%
EU15 (excluding Belgian) 2.8% 5.1% 7.3% 10.1%
others 7.1% 8.2% 2.3% 4.4%
Schooling level
primary 14.8% 22.3% 14.0% 20.4%
lower secondary 19.6% 17.7% 19.5% 21.6%
upper secondary 45.0% 42.0% 41.2% 35.2%
higher education 20.5% 17.8% 22.8% 15.1%
other studies 0.1% 0.3% 2.6% 7.8%
Category of insured unemployment(a)
head of household 14.8% 23.4% 19.5% 25.9%
single 24.3% 22.8% 27.5% 24.0%
cohabitant 61.0% 53.7% 53.0% 50.1%
Type of entitlement to beneﬁts(a)
work experience 83.0% 98.9% 74.2% 97.9%
school-leaver 17.0% 1.1% 25.8% 2.1%
Recent participation in training(a) (b) 18.0% 19.1% 13.4% 11.8%
Recent work experience(a) (b) 53.6% 42.8% 42.6% 31.2%
mean number of days in employment 87.3 80.7 93.1 78.2
(standard deviation) (71.6) (70.9) (76.4) (71.2)
Mean unemployment rate(c) by district 8.3% 8.2% 21.7% 21.0%
of living (standard deviation) (1.8) (1.8) (5.2) (5.4)
(a) At the sampling date, i.e. 2 months prior to the (potential) dispatch of the notiﬁcation letter.
(b) During the year before the sampling date.
(c) The ratio of the number of beneﬁt claimants available for the labor market and the number of
workers insured against unemployment, by district of living on May 31 (ONEM, 2004, p.65).
variables are evaluated at the sampling date, i.e. two months prior to the (potential) dispatch
of the notiﬁcation letter.
The composition of the population varies across both, regions and age groups. This matches
expectations. Younger workers e.g. are generally more educated and obviously more enti-
tled to beneﬁts as school-leaver. Note that this relation between observed characteristics and
age does not compromise the evaluation as long as it does not display a discontinuity at the
age of 30 (see Section 6.1.2).
Between 31% and 54% of the long-term unemployed workers has been employed during the
year prior to the selection date. This apparent contradiction is related to the administrative
9deﬁnition of unemployment duration within the monitoring procedure. In this deﬁnition
the duration counter23 is reset to zero only if the worker has been 12 months full time em-
ployed within the preceding 15 months. Consequently, the sample does not only contain
genuinely long-term unemployed workers, but also workers with unstable labor market ca-
reers. In the empirical analysis below it will be revealed that in Wallonia the treatment effect
differs importantly between these two groups.
Finally, the last line of Table 1 reveals the major divide in the labor market conditions be-
tween the northern and southern regions in Belgium. Even if the unemployment rates
reported in Table 1 are biased upwards,24 statistics based on the standard ILO deﬁnition
conﬁrm this divide. According to the ILO deﬁnition 5.5% of the Flemish and 12.1% of the
Walloon labor force was unemployed in 2004.25
4.2 The outcome variables
The outcome variables are measured at the end of each month following the (potential) dis-
patch of notiﬁcation up to the eighth month. The benchmark outcome is a discrete indicator
measuring whether any job has been found since the notiﬁcation. More precisely, the indi-
cator is set to one as soon as, within a month, one does not claim any UB as full-time unem-
ployed worker and is ofﬁcially registered as a salaried or self-employed worker. In order to
measure the quality of employment, we use two indicators: the gross full-time equivalent
(FTE) monthly wage and the employment duration in months. Since the wage is only known
for salaried employment, we measure the quality on this subset only. Note that we measure
employment duration and not job tenure.
Three additional outcome variables are analyzed. The ﬁrst is an indicator of participation in
training. This indicator comprises not only training strictu sensu, but also job search assis-
tance and re-enrollment in regular education. The second outcome variable is an indicator of
withdrawal from the labor force, deﬁned as the residual state. Finally, among withdrawals
from the labor force, we distinguish those to sickness insurance.
23The duration in months is obtained by dividing the number of claimed UB days by 26 and rounding down
to the nearest integer.
24The unemployment ﬁgures reported in Table 1 are based on an administrative deﬁnition of unemployment
in which the denominator is underestimated, since it excludes employment in public administrations. These are,
however, the only available unemployment rate statisitics at the district level.
25Source: www.steunpuntwse.be/view/nl/18767
105 The Econometric Model
The empirical analysis aims at identifying the effect on the various outcome variables de-
scribed in the previous section of a notiﬁcation announcing that job search effort will be
evaluated at least 8 months later. Identiﬁcation is based on the discontinuity of the treat-
ment at 30 years during the ﬁrst year of the reform starting on July 1, 2004. DD analysis is
by now well established in the economics literature (see e.g. Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee
and Lemieux, 2009). Nevertheless, we propose two contributions to this literature.
First, we consider a method that deals with a continuous forcing variable, age in this ap-
plication, that is grouped into intervals. This is closely related to the method of Lee and
Card (2008) for a discrete forcing variable. Lee and Card explain that this makes the method
essentially parametric and that standard errors must be adjusted for the speciﬁcation error
that follows on. The speciﬁcation error at each discrete value of the forcing variable induces
correlation between observations with the same discrete value. Cluster-consistent standard
errors tackle this problem. However, if the speciﬁcation error differs between the actual and
counterfactual treatment status at the (discrete) discontinuity threshold, then the standard
errors must be further inﬂated for the additional uncertainty. We show that if the forcing
variable is a grouped continuous variable (and the within-group distribution of the forcing
variable is known) this additional correction is not required. Intuitively, this is because the
underlying continuous forcing variable contains more information than a discrete one in that
it identiﬁes the exact location of the discontinuity point.26 The treatment effect being exactly
deﬁned at this point is no longer affected by speciﬁcation error.
Second, Lee and Card (2008) present a goodness-of-ﬁt statistic to verify whether conven-
tional least squares inference is appropriate. However, this statistic does not take the afore-
mentioned speciﬁcation error into account. We propose an adjustment that takes this into
account. In addition, we propose a grouping procedure that aims at avoiding the poor small
sample properties of this statistic. The test is related to the modiﬁed logit estimator proposed
by Amemiya and Nold (1975) for grouped discrete outcomes.27 Their estimation procedure
could also be adapted to DD. This would yield a more efﬁcient estimator. However, to
avoid small sample bias, more observations within each grouping of the forcing variable
than available in our data would be required.
In Section 4.1 we mentioned that the DD design is “fuzzy”.28 Nevertheless, throughout most
26The discontinuity point must be at the boundary of a grouping interval.
27Cockx and Ridder (2001), Cockx and Dejemeppe (2005) and Dejemeppe (2005) applied both, the estimation
method and test, to grouped duration models.
28Note that the fuzzy design is particular in that the treatment is only available at one side of the discontinuity
threshold: no individual older than 30 is assigned to the treatment. Battistin and Rettore (2008) show that in this
11ofthis section weassumethat thedesignissharp. There aretworeasons forthischoice. First,
model selection is simpler in the sharp case and, since the fraction of treated is never lower
than 85%, ignoring the fuzzy nature of the design will only lead to a slight under-estimation
of the treatment effect. Second, we don’t present any methodological contibution related to
the fuzziness of the design. In the presentation of the empirical results we will just report
the two-stage least squares (TSLS) estimator for the preferred speciﬁcations.
Wenowproceedbyderivingoureconometricmodelinthepresenceofagroupedcontinuous
forcing variable. In a second step, we propose the goodness-of-ﬁt test with a speciﬁcation
error.
5.1 DD with a grouped continuous forcing variable
Consider a continuous forcing variable X (age in the empirical application) which is mea-
sured in deviation from x0, the point at which the treatment status changes discontinu-
ously: D(X)=1[X < 0].29 In the data this forcing variable is grouped in 2J equally spaced
(monthly) intervals: [ J; J + 1);:::;[ 1;0);[0;1);:::[j;j + 1);:::[J   1;J). Let Y 1
k and Y 0
k
denote the potential outcomes of being treated or not as measured in the kth month after
the assignment to the (counterfactual) treatment.30 Assume that the expectations of these
potential outcomes, conditional on the continuous forcing variable, take the following form:
E[Y 0
k jX = x] = k + h0
k(x) and E[Y 1




continuous functions, each determined by at most J   1 parameters,31 and where we nor-
malize h0
k(0) = h1
k(0) = 0. From these we deﬁne the average treatment effects (ATE) at the
threshold of interest32 as follows
E[Y 1
k   Y 0
k jX = 0] = k (1)
It’s important to see that, in contrast to Lee and Card (2008), the ATE does not depend on a
speciﬁcation error. The reason is that the underlying forcing variable X is continuous and
not discrete, so that the exact location of the discontinuity point is identiﬁed and can be con-
ditioned upon.
case identiﬁcation assumptions of the sharp design are sufﬁcient to identify the average treatment effect of the
treated (ATT) at the discontinuity point.
29In the empirical application x0 = 360 months.
30In the empirical analysis this evaluation occurs in the k
th month after the notiﬁcation is (theoretically) dis-
patched.
31As a consequence of the grouping of the data, non-parametric identiﬁcation of the treatment effect is not
feasible (Lee and Card, 2008).
32As mentioned, we abstract from the fact that the DD is fuzzy. If this is taken into account, we can only




k jX = 0;D = 1].
12Now assume that we approximate h0
k(:) and h1

















for d 2 f0;1g and where a0
k(x) and a1
k(x) are speciﬁcation errors that indicate the degree
to which the true functions h0
k(:) and h1
k(:) deviate from the polynomial function. Note
a0
k(0) = a1
k(0) = 0 by the aforementioned normalization.
Denoting the observed outcome by Yk  Y 0
k +D(X)(Y 1
k  Y 0
k ), then, using (2), the regression
equation, as a function of the continuous forcing variable, can be expressed as















In order to relate the grouped regression function to the continuous one as expressed in (3)
we rely on the law of iterated expectations:
E[Ykjj  X < j + 1] =
Z j+1
j
[E[YkjX = x]f(Xjj  X < j + 1)]dx (4)
where f(Xjj  X < j + 1) is the conditional density of the forcing variable, conditional on
being in the interval [j;j + 1). Since the data are grouped by intervals, this density cannot
be identiﬁed from the data. However, it is reasonable to assume that the within month
distribution of birthdays of the sampled population is uniform.33 If we denote individual
observations by subscript i (i = 1;2;:::;N), this assumption combined with (3) and (4) yields
the following speciﬁcation of the regression model for the micro data:












+ ajk + ijk (5)
where ijk  Yijk  E[Ykjj  Xi < j +1], 
d
kp  ~ 
d
kp=(p+1) for d = 0;1, Dj 
R j+1
j D(x)dx =
D(j), and ajk 
R j+1
j ak(x)dx. To ensure consistency of the least squares (LS) estimator, we
33Note that a misspeciﬁed density (f(Xjj 1  X < j) = 1+u(X), where u(X) is the speciﬁcation error) may
induce correlation between the residual, which includes the speciﬁcation errors, and the included regressors and
thereby affect the consistency of the least squares estimator. Gans and Leigh (2009) cite studies reporting that
birth timing is not completely random: there are fewer births during week-ends, public holidays and during
weeks at which obstetrics yearly conferences take place; more births on auspicious days and 7-10 days prior to
Christmas. However, these days are not systematically related to particular days within a randomly selected
month and therefore no cause for concern.
13assume in addition that E[ajkjj  Xi < j + 1] = 0, 8j.
In principle we can estimate this regression model separately for each k. However, since the
sample size is relatively small, this yields imprecise estimates. In the empirical application,









p, 8k and 8p. As a consequence, the residuals are not only correlated between
individuals i within age groups j through the speciﬁcation error ajk, but also across time k,
both through ajk and ijk. Cluster-consistent standard errors at the group level j can take
this correlation into account.
5.2 A goodness-of-ﬁt test in the presence of speciﬁcation error
In this section we propose a goodness-of-ﬁt test in the presence of speciﬁcation error. The
idea is essentially that the average residual of a correctly speciﬁed model should be close
to zero. This can be implemented as a m-test (White, 1994). Assume that the speciﬁcation
error ajk is Normally distributed (with zero mean and constant variance) and independent
between age groups.34 If groups are sufﬁciently large (nj: ! 1, where nj: denotes the num-
ber of observations in group jk35), the sum of squared grouped residuals weighted by the
inverse of the variance matrix can be shown to converge, under the null hypothesis of cor-
rect speciﬁcation, to a 2 distribution with 2JK   M degrees of freedom. K is the number
of evaluation months after treatment, so that 2JK is the number of groups. M is the num-
ber of estimated parameters in the regression model. This 2-statistic forms the basis of our
goodness-of-ﬁt test.








j ^ V  1
j  ej  2(2JK   M) (6)
where ^ Vj denotes the estimated variance-covariance matrix of  ej. To calculate this statistic
we need to construct ^ Vj. How this can be done is shown in the Appendix.
A problem with this goodness-of-ﬁt statistic is that it is known to behave poorly in small
samples (in terms of nj:). Given that in our data the average group size is only just more
than 20 units, this problem is pertinent in this empirical application. To avoid this problem
we therefore group the data over wider age intervals, but only for testing, not for estimation.
34The speciﬁcation error can be correlated between k’s and between i’s within j’s.
35Note that nj: = nj1 = ::: = njk = ::: = njK: in age group j the sample contains the same number of
individuals in each month k after dispatch of the notiﬁcation.
14Since we consider only discrete binary outcomes, we use rules of thumb in the literature (Box
et al., 1978; Johnson et al., 2005) that ensure that the Normal approximation of the binomial
distribution is adequate. We enlarge the grouping until the three following conditions are




(1    Yjk)= Yjk  
q
 Yjk=(1    Yjk)
i 
 < 0:3; (iii)
nj: Yjk  3
q
nj: Yjk(1    Yjk) 2 [0;nj:]. Note that these conditions require a sufﬁciently large
number of “successes”/”failures” (nj: Yjk=nj:(1    Yjk)) in the outcome variable. Since right
after the (theoretical) dispatch of the letter only few individuals have a successful outcome
(found a job for the benchmark outcome), we consider only the effects on the outcome for
k 2 [2;8]: we leave out k = 1, so that K = 7.
We use this goodness-of-ﬁt test to select the appropriate (i) degree of the polynomial and (ii)
window width. For each window width, we estimate 3 spline polynomials of degree zero up
to two. We then choose within each window the polynomial that ﬁts best according to the
P-value of the goodness-of-ﬁt tests. Subsequently, the trade-off between bias and precision is
realized by retaining the widest window for which the model with the preferred polynomial
is not rejected at the conventional level of 5%.
The aforementioned testing procedure is related to one proposed by Lee and Lemieux (2009,
pp. 44-45; 54) and Lee and Card (2008, p. 658). They suggest to add J   2 (in our case
2K(J  1)) bin dummies to the polynomial in the forcing variable and test whether the coef-
ﬁcients of these bin dummies are jointly different from zero. In the case of a grouped forcing
variable, the model augmented with bin dummies is saturated at the grouped level. The test
then boils down to a goodness-of-ﬁt test of the polynomial against the saturated model. This
corresponds exactly to the test we propose, except that we explicitly allow for a speciﬁcation
error and that we group the data further to ensure that the distributional assumptions of the
test are satisﬁed.
Lee and Lemieux (2009) argue that this test can be interpreted as a falsiﬁcation test of the
DD, since a rejection of the test is evidence for discontinuities at other thresholds of the
forcing variable. Here the model may be rejected for another reason: the restriction that
the polynomials in age are constant over k may not be satisﬁed. The falsiﬁcation test then
consists in testing the polynomial regression model against one in which the polynomial
in age is replaced by a set of indicators for each age group j, but common for each k: the
difference of the goodness-of-ﬁt statistics between these models is 2 distributed with 2(J  
P) degrees of freedom. In fact we never reject any of the models on the basis of this statistic.
36In the few cases we could not fulﬁll this condition, we explicitly report this.
156 The Empirical Findings
6.1 The effect of notiﬁcation on the job ﬁnding rate
6.1.1 The average treatment effects and sensitivity analyses
Figure 1 displays descriptive evidence of the effect of notiﬁcation eight months after dis-
patch. The average transition rate in bins with a bandwidth of 10 months is plotted in a win-
dow of 5 years on either side of the cutoff point of 360 months. This bandwidth corresponds
to the ﬁnest grouping for which the Normal approximation to the binomial distribution is
adequate (see Section 5.2). A narrower bandwidth would make graphical evidence too noisy.
Figure 1: Discontinuity of the Job Finding Rate 8 Months after Notiﬁcation
Flanders Wallonia
Both in Flanders and in Wallonia the job ﬁnding rate is declining with age. At 360 months
the job ﬁnding rate declines more sharply, somewhat more clearly in Flanders than in Wal-
lonia. This is evidence that the notiﬁcation sent to the unemployed less than 30 years old
speeds up the transition to employment.
Table 2 reports the estimation results of linear regressions of the outcome variable on vari-
ous spline polynomials up to a second degree (P = 2) for sub-samples selected within an
increasingly narrow age window around the cutoff point. Although all models estimate si-
multaneously the impact between k = 2 and k = 8 months after notiﬁcation, we only report
the results at k = 8.37 Since the goodness-of-ﬁt test requires a grouping of 10-monthly inter-
vals, we consider 6 discontinuity samples: DS110-DS610. The discontinuity sample
DS  1  10 consists of the treated within the age bracket [350, 359] months and the control
37In both regions the treatment effect increases gradually over time. The time proﬁle is available on request.
16group in the bracket [360, 369]. The other discontinuity samples are deﬁned accordingly.
Table 2: The Effect on the Job Finding Rate 8 Months after Notiﬁcation (8) for Various
Windows and Polynomials
Window width DS  6  10 DS  5  10 DS  4  10 DS  3  10 DS  2  10 DS  1  10
Region Flanders
Polynom. order
Zero 0.130** (0.022) 0.124** (0.023) 0.099** (0.024) 0.073** (0.028) 0.084** (0.038) 0.100** (0.043)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.418] [0.165] [0.898] [na]
One 0.069** (0.035) 0.059 (0.037) 0.041 (0.042) 0.073 (0.049) 0.116** (0.054) 0.193** (0.083)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.080] [0.129] [0.902] [na]
Two 0.085* (0.048) 0.098* (0.053) 0.134** (0.054) 0.185** (0.057) 0.214** (0.077) 0.361** (0.122)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.090] [0.017] [0.788] [na]
Optimal order(a) na na 0 0 1 na
# indiv. = N 2.476 2.045 1.592 1.176 769 391
Region Wallonia
Polynom. order
Zero 0.109** (0.018) 0.105** (0.021) 0.081** (0.023) 0.068** (0.026) 0.051* (0.028) 0.049 (0.048)
[0.881] [0.969] [0.987] [0.949] [0.752] [na]
One 0.062** (0.031) 0.032 (0.034) 0.040 (0.038) 0.029 (0.049) 0.004 (0.057) 0.019 (0.071)
[0.898] [0.993] [0.983] [0.949] [0.724] [na]
Two 0.015 (0.047) 0.036 (0.053) 0.013 (0.062) -0.004 (0.067) -0.013 (0.067) 0.123* (0.064)
[0.867] [0.985] [0.968] [0.751] [0.552] [na]
Optimal order(a) 1 1 0 0 0 na
# indiv. = N 2.379 1.953 1.513 1.127 752 372
(a) Order of the model with the highest P-value according to the goodness-of-ﬁt test.
Standard errors in parentheses. P-values of the goodness-of-ﬁt test in square brackets. na = “not available”. In bold the
preferred estimate: model with optimal polynomial in the widest window not rejected at a P-value of 5%.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
The goodness-of-ﬁt test rejects for Flanders all models within the two widest windows (DS
510 and DS610). Since the falsiﬁcation tests described at the end of the previous section
reject none of these models,38 this rejection is no proof of discontinuity at other thresholds
of the forcing variable, but rather of non-constant polynomials in age. This is conﬁrmed if
we re-estimate the models for these age windows separately for each k. In that case we can
always ﬁnd a spline polynomial with P  2 for which the model is not rejected. However,
the treatment effects of the preferred speciﬁcations are very imprecisely estimated and never
signiﬁcantly different from zero.39 We therefore prefer the estimates for narrower windows
in Flanders.
For the narrower windows we always ﬁnd a polynomial for which the goodness-of-ﬁt test
is not rejected in Flanders.40 The optimal polynomial degree (in terms of the P-value of the
38The lowest P-value of the X
2-tests of the 6 considered models is 0.23.
39For DS610 and DS510 the retained polynomial degree, P, is respectively 1 and 2, and the treatment
effect (standard error) at k = 8 months 0:042 (0:042) and 0:103 (0:065).
40Note that for DS110 we cannot calculate the P-value of the goodness-of-ﬁt statistic, since, by aggregation,
the number of estimated parameters exceeds the number of grouped data points. In this case it is reasonable to
choose P = 0.
17goodness-of-ﬁt) ranges between zero and one and the corresponding treatment effects be-
tween 7:3 and 11:6 percentage points and is always signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Our preferred
estimate on which we will perform a number of additional sensitivity analyses is the 9:9
percentage points effect of DS  4  10. This corresponds to a proportional increase of the
transition to employment of 28%.
For Wallonia the goodness-of-ﬁt test rejects none of the estimated models. The effects cor-
responding to the models with optimal polynomial range between 2:9 and 8:1 percentage
points and are not always signiﬁcantly different from zero. So, the ﬁndings for Wallonia
tend to be somewhat lower and less robust than for Flanders. The preferred estimate for
DS  6  10 is 6.2 percentage points or 22% in proportional terms.
Table 3: The Effect on the Job Finding Rate 8 Months after Notiﬁcation (8): Control-
ling for Covariates and TSLS
Flanders Wallonia
Benchmark with X TSLS Benchmark with X TSLS
8
(a) 0.351** 0.351** 0.351** 0.284** 0.284** 0.284**
(standard error) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
8
(b) 0.099** 0.096** 0.110** 0.062** 0.069** 0.067**
(standard error) (0.024) (0.022) (0.027) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033)
Order of the polynomial 0 1
Window width DS  4  10 DS  6  10
(a) The job ﬁnding rate without notiﬁcation for 30 year olds.
(b) The ATE for 30 year olds.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Table 3 reports two further sensitivity analyses for the preferred estimates: (i) adding in the
control variables reported in Table 1; (ii) explicitly accounting for the “fuzzy” nature of the
DD by implementing a TSLS estimator. In line with expectations, the treatment effects are
hardly affected.
6.1.2 Testing the validity of the DD
In the previous section we already discussed that there is no evidence for discontinuities
at other thresholds of the forcing variable. In this section an additional falsiﬁcation test is
presented. We check for the presence of a placebo treatment effect in the year prior to the
reform. Furthermore, we will test for precise manipulation of the DD.
Table 4 reports, for the preferred estimates, the effect of a placebo treatment on a sample of
unemployed workers aged between 25 and 34 years old to whom a notiﬁcation would have
been sent if the reform was in place in 2003. The estimated impact in both regions is only 2
percentage points and not signiﬁcantly different from zero. In the sensitivity analysis (not
reported) only one of the effects, not rejected on the basis of the goodness-of-ﬁt test, was
18Table 4: Placebo Treatment Effect in 2003
Flanders Wallonia
Benchmark 2003 Benchmark 2003
8
(a) 0.351** 0.336** 0.284** 0.253**
(standard error) (0.018) (0.015) (0.024) (0.022)
8
(b) 0.099** 0.018 0.062** 0.020
(standard error) (0.024) (0.021) (0.031) (0.028)
Order of the polynomial 0 1
Window width DS  4  10 DS  6  10
(a) The job ﬁnding rate without notiﬁcation for 30 year olds.
(b) The ATE for 30 year olds.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
signiﬁcant.41
The DD approach is only valid to the extent that individuals cannot alter their behavior
- "manipulate the forcing variable" - to avoid (or to beneﬁt from) the treatment, i.e. “to
precisely “sort” around the discontinuity threshold” (Lee, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2009). In
this study the forcing variable, age, can not be manipulated directly, but indirectly, since
assignment to the treatment is not solely based on age, but also on being a beneﬁt claimant
for 13 months or more. This unemployment duration can be manipulated if the unemployed
workers anticipate the dispatch of the notiﬁcation and leave unemployment even before the
notiﬁcation. Note, however, as stressed by Lee (2008), that this manipulation invalidates
the DD only to the extent that workers have a precise control over exit from unemployment.
For instance, if anticipation implies increased job search, this need not invalidate the DD,
since the outcome of the job search process is random, so that the worker cannot avoid the
notiﬁcationwithcertainty. Itwouldbemoreproblematiciftheworkerwould, inanticipation
of the notiﬁcation, decide to decline her entitlement to UB. However, it’s unlikely that a
written notiﬁcation raises the perceived marginal cost to that extent. Nevertheless, we test
for the presence of this kind of precise manipulation.
Table 5: The Exit Rate from Unemployment One




(standard error) (0.008) (0.011)
8
(b) -0.001 -0.024
(standard error) (0.012) (0.016)
Order of the polynomial 0 1
Window width DS  4  10 DS  6  10
(a) The exit rate without notiﬁcation for 30 year olds.
(b) The ATE for 30 year olds.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
We implement three tests. First, since the sample is selected two months before notiﬁcation
(cf. Section 4.1), we can verify by DD whether workers slightly below the age of 30 years
are more likely to leave unemployment (we include exit to training and from the labor force
41This occurs for DS  4  10 and P = 0, but for P > 0 the effects are virtually zero.
19in this deﬁnition) one month before notiﬁcation than workers slightly older than 30. As can
be deduced from Table 5, the exit rate from UB in the month prior to notiﬁcation does not
exhibit any signiﬁcant discontinuity at 360 months. Second, we test whether the 18 prede-
termined characteristics (reported in Table 1) are smooth around the cutoff age. To do so,
we follow the suggestion of Lee and Lemieux (2009) to estimate for the widest window size
all 18 regression equations with a linear spline jointly in a Seemingly Unrelated Regression
(SUR) and test for the joint signiﬁcance of discontinuities at the cutoff point. The absence of
a discontinuity cannot be rejected at a P-value of 18% for Flanders and 44% for Wallonia.42
Finally, we test whether the density of the forcing variable is continuous around the thresh-
old (McCrary, 2008). This density test is graphically represented in the two panels of Figure
2. From this ﬁgure, but also from the formal tests (not reported), there is no evidence for any
discontinuity.
Figure 2: Graphical Density Test of the Forcing Variable
Flanders Wallonia
6.2 Heterogeneity of the effect on the job ﬁnding rate
In this section we brieﬂy investigate whether the effect on the transition to employment dif-
fers importantly between sub-populations. In view of the relatively small sample size, the
analysis of treatment heterogeneity is limited. Moreover, the results are less precise and ro-
bust than for the main analysis. They should therefore be interpreted with some caution.43
To avoid the multiple comparisons problem, the choice of the heterogeneity dimensions is
based on a priori grounds. First, since for most households it is still the case that the respon-
42For Flanders 3 variables were individually signiﬁcant at the 5% level: lower secondary school, school-leaver
and numbers of days employed during the year before the sampling date. For Wallonia none of the variables
were individually signiﬁcant.
43The sensitivity analysis can be obtained from the authors on request. Note, to avoid small sample problems
in the goodness-of-test statistic, the data had to be grouped over wider age intervals: the width of grouping
intervals varies between 12 and 20 months, depending on region and sub-population. In one case (the low
educated DS  3  20 in Wallonia) the grouping criteria of Section 5.2 were not satisﬁed for one cell.
20sibility for child and elderly care falls disproportionately on the female partner, we expect,
as reported by Dolton and O’Neill (2002), that women are less likely to leave unemployment
for a job than men. Second, we expect the threat effect of monitoring, combined with the ef-
fect of counseling in Wallonia, to be larger for workers with more favorable re-employability
chances, such as the higher educated and those living in districts with relatively low un-
employment rates: changes in job search behavior are more likely to result in a successful
transition to employment. Finally, we expect smaller effects for those with a recent employ-
ment experience,44 since these workers can more easily prove that they have searched and
continue searching for jobs.
Table 6: Heterogeneity of the Treatment Effect
Region Flanders
Sub-populations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
8
(a) 0.354** 0.403** 0.424** 0.307** 0.308** 0.440** 0.439** 0.255**
(standard error) (0.027) (0.046) (0.024) (0.031) (0.023) (0.036) (0.024) (0.019)
8
(b) 0.125** 0.004 0.062* 0.079* 0.124** 0.021 0.115** 0.104**
(standard error) (0.035) (0.058) (0.037) (0.040) (0.033) (0.052) (0.030) (0.027)
Optimal polynomial order(c) 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
P-value goodness-of-ﬁt 0.166 0.095 0.367 0.096 0.323 0.807 0.548 0.578
P-value F equality test 0.091 0.749 0.103 0.777
# indiv. = N 927 1 028 595 580 1 043 912 1 201 1 275
Window width(d) DS  4  12 DS  2  15 DS  4  12 DS  4  15
Region Wallonia
Sub-populations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
8
(a) 0.265** 0.271** 0.306** 0.251** 0.265** 0.270** 0.466** 0.193**
(standard error) (0.023) (0.020) (0.019) (0.033) (0.022) (0.022) (0.056) (0.012)
8
(b) 0.101** 0.055* 0.119** 0.024 0.041 0.124** -0.037 0.116**
(standard error) (0.030) (0.030) (0.025) (0.043) (0.032) (0.032) (0.063) (0.021)
Optimal polynomial order(c) 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
P-value goodness-of-ﬁt 0.493 0.304 0.362 0.068 0.312 0.380 0.647 0.458
P-value F equality test 0.240 0.051 0.072 0.025
# indiv. = N 833 680 1 177 1 085 764 749 891 1 488
Window width(d) DS  2  20 DS  3  20 DS  2  20 DS  3  20
(1) Men; (2) Women; (3) Higher education; (4) Lower education; (5) High (above regional median) unemployment rate;
(6) Low (below median) unemployment rate; (7) Recent work experience; (8) No recent work experience.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
(a) The job ﬁnding rate without notiﬁcation for 30 year olds.
(b) The ATE for 30 year olds.
(c) Order of the model with the highest P-value according to the goodness-of-ﬁt test.
(d) Widest window for which no sub-model is rejected at a P-value of 5%.
Table 6 displays the treatment effects for the various sub-populations in the two regions.
We report the estimates of the models with “optimal” polynomial and with the widest age
grouping for which the goodness-of-ﬁt test does not reject the model for any of the two con-
sidered subpopulations (e.g. men and women) at a 5% level. The table includes the P-value
of an F-test of the equality of the subgroup effects.
44“Recent” is within one year before the sample selection date.
21Figure 3: Signiﬁcant Heterogeneity of the Treatment Effect
Flanders - men Flanders - women
Wallonia - higher educated Wallonia - lower educated
Wallonia - high unemployment Wallonia - low unemployment
Wallonia - recent work experience Wallonia - no recent work experience
22If we set the P-value of this F-test at 10%, there is no evidence of treatment heterogeneity in
Flanders, except for gender. In Wallonia, by contrast, the F-test is signiﬁcant for all the vari-
ables, except for gender. Figure 3 illustrates the DD for the cases in which the heterogeneity
is signiﬁcant. The lack of heterogeneity in Flanders may be related to the following factors.
First, in a tighter labor market, such as in Flanders, the impact of enhanced job search trans-
lates more easily in employment, irrespective of the employability of the workers. Second,
in a tight labor market, the sorting process weeds out the most employable workers more
rapidly than when the labor market is slack. This means that in a tight labor market there is
less heterogenity in a population of long-term unemployed workers. Thirdly, since notiﬁed
beneﬁt claimants were only counseled in Wallonia, it could be that heterogeneity is induced
by counseling. Counselors elucidate the monitoring procedure and, as a consequence, some
groups might better understand that they are less at risk of a negative evaluation, such as
workers with recent employment experience, but also low educated workers and workers
living in high unemployment districts, since in the evaluation of job search effort it is taken
into account that these factors make it more difﬁcult to ﬁnd job offers.
In both regions, the threat of monitoring has, as expected, more impact on men than on
women. In Wallonia this difference is not signiﬁcant, but this may be related to the impre-
cision of the estimates. In Wallonia, the differential impacts of all the other variables are
signiﬁcant and have the sign that was expected on a priori grounds. In Flanders, as men-
tioned and justiﬁed, no treatment heterogeneity for the other variables is signiﬁcant.45
6.3 The effect on the quality of employment
Imposing job search requirements may speed up the transition to work, but at the same
time there is a risk that the quality of employment is affected. Lower quality employment
is deﬁned as employment with a lower FTE starting wage (employment duration) than the
median for a 30 year old worker.46 Note, however, that the DD cannot identify the causal
impact on quality. If the treatment induces more transitions to lower quality jobs, this can
be either because the treatment causes employment to be of lower quality or because the
treatment causes transitions to employment that would have been of lower quality anyway.
Table 7 summarizes the results of the preferred models according to the goodness-of-ﬁt
tests.47 Since wages and employment durations are only observed for salaried employment,
45In Flanders the ATE increases (at the margin of signiﬁcance) with the unemployment rate, but this ﬁnding
is not robust (not reported).
46These medians are estimated on the control group (the 30-34 year olds) from a quantile regression with linear
polynomial in age.
47A sensitivity analysis with respect to window widths and polynomial degrees is reported in Tables A-1-A-4
in Appendix A-2.
23Table 7: The Effect on the Quality of Employment
Region Flanders
Outcome variable Wage Wage Duration Duration
<50%(a) >=50%(a) < 50%(a) >=50%(a)
Outcome without treatment (8) 0.172 0.170 0.148 0.162
(standard error) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.012)
Treatment effect (8) 0.059** 0.000 0.083** 0.044**
(standard error) (0.019) (0.026) (0.017) (0.017)
Polynomial order(b) 0 1 0 0
P-value for goodness-of -ﬁt 0.408 0.069 0.741 0.074
P-value for F equality test 0.101 0.145
# indiv. = N 1 592 2 476 2 476 2 476
Window width(c) DS  2  20 DS  3  20 DS  3  20 DS  3  20
Region Wallonia
Outcome without treatment (8) 0.115 0.130 0.110 0.137
(standard error) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011)
Treatment effect (8) 0.051** 0.040** 0.071** 0.002
(standard error) (0.013) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015)
Polynomial order(b) 0 0 0 0
P-value for goodness-of-ﬁt 0.252 0.277 0.861 0.328
P-value for F equality test 0.629 0.002
# indiv. = N 2 379 1 513 2 379 1 513
Window width(c) DS  3  20 DS  2  20 DS  3  20 DS  2  20
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
(a) Median FTE gross starting wage and median employment duration for 30 year olds in the absence
of notiﬁcation in Flanders (Wallonia) = 1964e(1911e) and 10 (9.4) months.
(b) Order of the model with the highest P-value according to the goodness-of-ﬁt test.
(c) Widest window in which the goodness-of-ﬁt test is not rejected at a P-value of 5%.
we restricted the outcomes accordingly. The second and third column contain the policy
impact on transitions below and above the median of the outcomes, wage and employment
duration.48 The P-value of the reported F-test allows to check for each outcome whether the
effects on the transitions below and above the median are signiﬁcantly different from each
other.
First, it strikes that in Flanders only the effect on transitions to low-wage jobs is signiﬁcant
whereas in Wallonia the effect on both, transitions to low and high wage jobs is signiﬁcant.
This is consistent with the theoretical prediction (cf. Section 3) that the pure threat of moni-
toring reduces the reservation wage, but that this effect can be undone if it is combined with
counseling, since this raises the reservation wage.
Second, in both regions transitions to short-term employment increase signiﬁcantly and
more than to long-term employment. In addition, in Flanders the effect on transitions to
long-term employment differs signiﬁcantly from zero. However, the latter effect is not at
all robust if the window width is narrowed: the effect for other window widths is virtually
48The sum of the impacts for each outcome does not correspond to the total impact reported in Table 2 for two
reasons: (i) Table 2 includes self-employment; (ii) the sum equals the total only if each sub-impact is estimated
with the same window size and polynomial degree as for the total effect.
24zero.49 We therefore conclude that the evidence for Flanders suggests that a pure threat of
monitoring lowers the quality of employment, both in terms of wages and employment du-
ration.
Despite the presence of counseling in Wallonia no signiﬁcant increase to long-term employ-
mentisobserved. Thismayberelatedtothefactthatcounselingoftenresultsinparticipation
in training (as documented in the next section): as a consequence of locking-in, transitions
to more long-lasting employment may occur after the end of the observation period.
6.4 Theeffectontransitionsintotraining, outofthelaborforceandintosickness
insurance
Table 8 shows the results of the analysis on three other outcome variables: the transition
into training, out of the labor force and into sickness insurance. It reports the treatment
effects (slightly underestimated, since the fuzzy design is not taken into account) for the
optimal polynomial and the window for which the model is not rejected on the basis of
the goodness-of-ﬁt statistic. For each of the outcome variables both sensitivity analyses and
validity checks were performed as for the benchmark outcome (see Section 6.1).50
Since participation in training may positively affect the evaluation at the monitoring inter-
view, we expect an increase in the participation rate. In Flanders, eight months after notiﬁ-
cation the participation rate is indeed 3.6 percentage points higher than without a notiﬁca-
tion. This effect is only signiﬁcant at the 10% level, however. Systematic counseling for the
notiﬁed group, as present in Wallonia, increases training participation dramatically by 7.7
percentage points. This is illustrated in Figure 4.
As argued in Section 3, we do not expect that the threat of monitoring should affect much the
transitions out of the labor force except for transitions to sickness insurance, since workers
are entitled to the same beneﬁt level as in UI. In Flanders we don’t observe any signiﬁcant
increase in the exit from the labor force. In Wallonia, by contrast, this exit rate increases
signiﬁcantly by 4.3 percentage points. If we decompose this effect, we ﬁnd that this effect
is virtually completely caused by a 6.4 percentage point increase in the transition rate of
women to sickness insurance (see also Figure 5).
Why is this effect only present for women in Wallonia? As already mentioned, since women
take disproportionately more responsibility for child and elderly care, they have more incen-
49See Table A-4 in the Appendix.
50The sensitivity analysis with respect to window widths and polynomial degrees is reported in Tables A-5-
A-7 in Appendix A-2.
25Table 8: The Effect on Transitions into Training, out of the Labor Force and into Sick-
ness Insurance
Region Flanders
Outcome Training Out of Labor Force Sickness Insurance
All Men Women All Men Women
8
(a) 0.192 0.175 0.133 0.216 0.074 0.037 0.107
(standard error) (0.015) (0.014) (0.020) (0.026) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014)
8
(b) 0.036* 0.010 0.013 0.001 0.012 -0.010 0.033
(standard error) (0.021) (0.025) (0.030) (0.038) (0.012) (0.010) (0.021)
Pol. order(c) 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
P-value ﬁt 0.854 0.750 -(d) -(d) 0.467(e) -(d) -(d)
# indiv. = N 1 176 2 476 1 177 1 299 2 476 1 177 1 299
Window width(f) DS  3  10 DS  3  20 DS  3  20
Region Wallonia
Outcome Training Out of Labor Force Sickness Insurance
All Men Women All Men Women
8
(a) 0.098 0.087 0.088 0.086 0.041 0.031 0.053
(standard error) (0.009) (0.012) (0.016) (0.019) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
8
(b) 0.077** 0.043** -0.012 0.114** 0.023** -0.012 0.064**
(standard error) (0.013) (0.017) (0.022) (0.028) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017)
Pol. order(c) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
P-value ﬁt 0.598 0.190(e) -(d) -(d) 0.314(e) -(d) -(d)
# indiv. = N 2 379 1 513 833 680 2 379 1 283 1 096
Window width(f) DS  3  20 DS  2  20 DS  3  20
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
(a) The job ﬁnding rate without notiﬁcation for 30 year olds.
(b) The ATE for 30 year olds.
(c) Order of the model with the highest P-value according to the goodness-of-ﬁt test.
(d) Goodness-of-ﬁt statistic completely unreliable because of too small sample size.
(e) Rules of thumb not satisﬁed for all groups: goodness-of-ﬁt statistics are not reliable.
(f) Widest window in which the goodness-of-ﬁt test is not rejected at a P-value of 5%.
Figure 4: The Effect on the Transition into Training in Wallonia
tives to ﬁnd alternatives to working. Moreover, since this reason for not searching for jobs is
socially more accepted for women than for men, counselors of PES may suggest this option
to women and physicians might be more willing to prescribe sickness or disability, even if
it is not strictly justiﬁed. Alternatively, long-term dependency on unemployment may affect
the mental health of women. However, there is evidence that unemployment causes mental
health problems only for men and not for women, at least shortly after job loss (Kuhn et
26Figure 5: The Effect on the Transition into Sickness Insurance for Women in Wallonia
al., 2009).
Why is this not observed in Flanders? To answer this question, note ﬁrst that in Flanders the
transition rate to sickness insurance for 30 year olds is in the absence of notiﬁcation nearly
double as high as in Wallonia: 7.4% versus 4.1%. The notiﬁcation therefore merely shifts
the transition level in Wallonia to the Flemish level. This may be related to the fact that,
irrespective of the notiﬁcation, the unemployed in Flanders have more contacts with the
regional PES than in Wallonia.51 Thus, both Flemish and Walloon counselors might suggest
to women the option of a transition to sickness beneﬁts. Since the contact rate with the
regional PES is in Wallonia much lower for those aged more than 30 than for the younger
group, we observe this discontinuity in Wallonia, but not in Flanders.
7 Conclusion
This research studied the impact of an important reform in Belgium which introduced for
the ﬁrst time job search requirements into UI. More speciﬁcally, it investigated whether a no-
tiﬁcation sent to long-term unemployed beneﬁt claimants had any impact on the job ﬁnding
rate, on the quality of employment and on the rate of labor force withdrawal. The analysis
was performed separately in two regions. In Wallonia the regional PES systematically starts
counseling the unemployed two months after notiﬁcation. In Flanders a pure threat effect
of the notiﬁcation is measured. The estimation is based on a DD at the age of 30 years that
resulted from a gradual introduction of the reform by age group.
Eight months after the notiﬁcation the transition rate to employment was roughly 10 and 6
51In the year preceding sample selection nearly 60% of the Flemish unemployed aged 25-29 had a contact with
the regional PES (collectitive/individual meeting, training, etc.) against only 18% of the Walloon unemployed.
27percentage points higher, respectively in Flanders and Wallonia. This corresponds to a pro-
portional increase of 28% and 22%. The larger impact in Flanders is probably related to the
more favorable labor market conditions in this region than in Wallonia. However, the pres-
ence of systematic counseling of the notiﬁed group in Wallonia may also play a role. On the
one hand counseling may elucidate for some unemployed workers, such as those with a re-
cent employment experience, living in high unemployment districts and the lower educated,
that the threat of monitoring is less acute. On the other hand, it stimulates participation in
training which, through a locking-in effect, may delay the transition to employment beyond
the observation period.
However, consistent with theoretical predictions, in Flanders the beneﬁt of the pure threat
effect in terms of transitions to employment comes at a cost of the quality of employment,
both in terms of the wage level and the duration of the employment relationship. In Wallonia
counseling undoes the negative effect on the wage, but not on employment duration. The
latter ﬁnding may, however, be a consequence of the too short observation period: workers
may be locked into training programs and transit to more long-lasting employment after-
wards.
Finally, inbothregionsthereformstimulatesmorethere-employmentofmenthanofwomen.
In addition, in Wallonia the policy induces women, but not men, to withdraw from the la-
bor force. These women transit to sickness insurance which entitles them to equally large
beneﬁts as UI. This is consistent with the social norm that women are more responsible for
caring and less obliged to search for jobs. Counselors and physicians of the sickness insur-
ance may therefore be more lenient for women than for men. In Flanders no increase in the
withdrawal rate from the labor force is observed. However, in Flanders the rate of transition
to sickness insurance is already at the high post-reform level of Wallonia in the absence of
notiﬁcation. We argue that this is a consequence of the higher contact rate with the regional
PES in Flanders irrespective of notiﬁcation: counselors may suggest women the option of
sickness insurance as a way to fulﬁll their caring duties without income loss.
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28Appendix
A-1 Construction of the variance matrix of the residuals
The variance matrix of the residuals ^ Vj is constructed in three steps. First, if we assume that the
“approximation errors”, ijk, are i.i.d. within groups jk, then a consistent (for nj: ! 1) estimate of
the variance (k = l) and covariance (k 6= l) is given by52










^ ijk^ ijl (A-1)




Second, let ^  ejk denote the (unweighted) residuals of a weighted LS regression of model (5) in which
the data are grouped by age group j and by month k and in which the weights are set to nj:=(N=J).53
It is not difﬁcult to show that these residuals are equivalent to the average residuals of the micro-
regression: ^  ejk = ( Yjk   Wjk^ k), where Wjk is the vector of explanatory variables in (5) and where
^ k is the vector of parameter estimates of the unweighted OLS regression on micro-data. Since the
residual is a sum of a speciﬁcation and a grouped approximation error ( ejk = ajk +  jk), a consistent
(for J ! 1) estimator of variance and covariance of the speciﬁcation errors ajk can be found by
subtracting from the weighted (co-)variance54 of the grouped regression residuals ^  ejk the weighted
(co-)variance of the grouped approximation errors  jk:


















nj:^  ejk^  ejl   ^ jkl

(A-2)
where we set ^ akk = 0 if the right-hand side becomes negative and ^ akl = 0 if ^ akk = 0 or ^ all = 0.
Finally, if ^ vjkl denotes the kth row and lth column of ^ Vj, we have




52If, as in the empirical application, the outcome variable is discrete indicator of a past transition to another
labor market state (implying that the indicator cannot revert to zero once it has changed to one) it is not difﬁcult
to show that ^ jkl =  Yjk(1    Yjl)nj=(nj   1), reﬂecting the binomial distribution of the discrete indicator.
53N=J is equal to the average group size.
54Note that, in contrast to ^ Vj this (co-)variance is unconditional on j.
29A-2 Sensitivity Analysis for Various Outcomes
Table A-1: The Effect (8) on Transitions to Low Wage Jobs
Window width DS  3  20 DS  2  20 DS  1  20
Region Flanders
Polynomial order
Zero 0.077** (0.017) [ 0.001] 0.059** (0.019) [0.408] 0.069** (0.031) [na]
One 0.050* (0.028) [0.000] 0.046 (0.034) [0.201] 0.070 (0.046) [na]
Two 0.076* (0.039) [0.000] 0.092** (0.044) [0.085] 0.134** (0.060) [na]
Optimal order(a) 0 0 na
# indiv. = N 2 476 1 592 769
Wallonia
Zero 0.051** (0.013) [ 0.252] 0.031* (0.017) [0.218] 0.027 (0.022) [na]
One 0.029 (0.022) [0.222] 0.027 (0.027) [0.426] 0.005 (0.035) [na]
Two 0.021 (0.031) [0.223] 0.003 (0.037) [0.260] -0.043 (0.036) [na]
Optimal order(a) 0 1 na
# indiv. = N 2 379 1 513 752
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Standard errors in parentheses.
P-values of the goodness-of-ﬁt test in square brackets. na = “not available”. In bold the
preferred estimate: model with optimal polynomial in the widest window not rejected at a
P-value of 5%. A low wage is deﬁned as a FTE gross starting wage below the median for 30
year olds in the absence of notiﬁcation: in Flanders (Wallonia) this wage is 1964e(1911e).
(a) Order of the model with the highest P-value according to the goodness-of-ﬁt test.
Table A-2: The Effect (8) on Transitions to High Wage Jobs
Window width DS  3  20 DS  2  20 DS  1  20
Region Flanders
Polynomial order
Zero 0.050** (0.016) [ 0.042] 0.032 (0.021) [0.015] 0.001 (0.030) [na]
One 0.000 (0.026) [0.069] -0.018 (0.033) [0.018] 0.032 (0.044) [na]
Two -0.002 (0.037) [0.047] 0.031 (0.045) [0.001] 0.050 (0.066) [na]
Optimal order(a) 1 1 na
# indiv. = N 2 476 1 592 769
Wallonia
Zero 0.050** (0.013) [ 0.002] 0.040** (0.017) [0.277] 0.022 (0.024) [na]
One 0.031 (0.025) [0.002] 0.019 (0.031) [0.210] 0.003 (0.044) [na]
Two 0.004 (0.037) [0.001] 0.011 (0.047) [0.112] 0.031 (0.058) [na]
Optimal order(a) 0 0 na
# indiv. = N 2 379 1 513 752
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Standard errors in paren-
theses. P-values of the goodness-of-ﬁt test in square brackets. na = “not available”. In
bold the preferred estimate: model with optimal polynomial in the widest window not
rejected at a P-value of 5%. A high wage is deﬁned as a FTE gross starting wage below
the median for 30 year olds in the absence of notiﬁcation: in Flanders (Wallonia) this
wage is 1964e(1911e).
(a) Order of the model with the highest P-value according to the goodness-of-ﬁt test.
30Table A-3: The Effect (8) on Transitions to Short Employment Spells
Window width DS  3  20 DS  2  20 DS  1  20
Region Flanders
Polynomial order
Zero 0.083** (0.017) [ 0.741] 0.077** (0.021) [0.130] 0.077** (0.031) [na]
One 0.055** (0.028) [0.658] 0.051 (0.033) [0.132] 0.103** (0.043) [na]
Two 0.086** (0.037) [0.385] 0.108** (0.045) [0.033] 0.117** (0.055) [na]
Optimal order(a) 0 1 na
# indiv. = N 2 476 1 592 769
Wallonia
Zero 0.071** (0.014) [ 0.861] 0.069** (0.017) [0.000] 0.040* (0.023) [na]
One 0.053** (0.025) [0.798] 0.026 (0.031) [0.212] -0.008 (0.047) [na]
Two -0.006 (0.039) [0.680] -0.009 (0.050) [0.854] -0.053 (0.068) [na]
Optimal order(a) 0 2 na
# indiv. = N 2 379 1 513 752
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Standard errors in parentheses.
P-values of the goodness-of-ﬁt test in square brackets. na = “not available”. In bold the
preferred estimate: model with optimal polynomial in the widest window not rejected at a
P-value of 5%. A short employment spell lasts less than the median employment duration
for 30 year olds in the absence of notiﬁcation: in Flanders (Wallonia) this is 10 (9.4) months.
(a) Order of the model with the highest P-value according to the goodness-of-ﬁt test.
Table A-4: The Effect (8) on Transitions to Long Employment
Spells
Window width DS  3  20 DS  2  20 DS  1  20
Region Flanders
Polynomial order
Zero 0.044** (0.017) [ 0.074] 0.013 (0.020) [0.348] -0.007 (0.028) [na]
One -0.005 (0.026) [0.071] -0.023 (0.032) [0.241] -0.002 (0.042) [na]
Two -0.013 (0.037) [0.045] 0.015 (0.041) [0.132] 0.067 (0.049) [na]
Optimal order(a) 0 0 na
# indiv. = N 2 476 1 592 769
Wallonia
Zero 0.030** (0.014) [ 0.049] 0.002 (0.015) [0.328] 0.009 (0.023) [na]
One 0.008 (0.022) [0.028] 0.020 (0.025) [0.180] 0.016 (0.035) [na]
Two 0.032 (0.030) [0.021] 0.023 (0.034) [0.094] 0.041 (0.046) [na]
Optimal order(a) 0 0 na
# indiv. = N 2 379 1 513 752
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Standard errors in paren-
theses. P-values of the goodness-of-ﬁt test in square brackets. na =“not available”. In
bold the preferred estimate: model with optimal polynomial in the widest window not
rejected at a P-value of 5%. A long employment spell lasts less than the median employ-
ment duration for 30 year olds in the absence of notiﬁcation: in Flanders (Wallonia) this
is 10 (9.4) months.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32Table A-6: The Effect (8) on Transitions out of the Labor Force
Window size DS  3  20 DS  2  20 DS  1  20
Region Flanders
Polynomial order
Zero 0.042** (0.015) [0.728] 0.032* (0.019) [0.720] 0.038 (0.027) [na]
One 0.010 (0.025) [0.750] 0.008 (0.031) [0.893] -0.019 (0.050) [na]
Two 0.028 (0.037) [0.607] 0.016 (0.050) [0.779] 0.023 (0.060) [na]
Optimal order(a) 1 1 na
# indiv. = N 2 476 1 592 769
Wallonia
Zero 0.050** (0.013) [0.033](b) 0.043** (0.017) [0.190](b) 0.034 (0.025) [na]
One 0.034 (0.023) [0.015](b) 0.051* (0.029) [0.173](b) 0.060 (0.040) [na]
Two 0.053 (0.034) [0.005](b) 0.050 (0.042) [0.088](b) 0.135** (0.049) [na]
Optimal order(a) 0(b) 0(b) na
# indiv. = N 2 379 1 513 752
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Standard errors in parentheses.
P-values of the goodness-of-ﬁt test in square brackets. na = “not available”. In bold the
preferred estimate: model with optimal polynomial in the widest window not rejected at
a P-value of 5%.
(a) Order of the model with the highest P-value according to the goodness-of-ﬁt test.
(b) Rules of thumb not satisﬁed for all groups: goodness-of-ﬁt statistics are not reliable.
Table A-7: The Effect (8) on Transitions to Sickness Insurance
Window size DS  3  20 DS  2  20 DS  1  20
Region Flanders
Polynomial order
Zero 0.012 (0.012) [0.467](b) 0.009 (0.015) [0.413](b) 0.029 (0.020) [na]
One 0.021 (0.019) [0,433](b) 0.037 (0.022) [0.209](b) 0.045 (0.033) [na]
Two 0.058** (0.026) [0.267](b) 0.054 (0.033) [0.119](b) 0.088** (0.041) [na]
Optimal order(a) 0(b) 0(b) na
# indiv. = N 2.476 1.592 769
Wallonia
Zero 0.023** (0.009) [0.100](b) 0.021* (0.012) [0.314](b) 0.019 (0.017) [na]
One 0.021 (0.016) [0.043](b) 0.035* (0.019) [0.000](b) 0.047* (0.027) [na]
Two 0.036 (0.022) [0.019](b) 0.041 (0.029) [0.000](b) 0.093** (0.034) [na]
Optimal order(a) 0(b) 0(b) na
# indiv. = N 2.379 1.513 752
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Standard errors in parentheses.
P-values of the goodness-of-ﬁt test in square brackets. na = “not available”. In bold the
preferred estimate: model with optimal polynomial in the widest window not rejected at a
P-value of 5%.
(a) Order of the model with the highest P-value according to the goodness-of-ﬁt test.
(b) Rules of thumb not satisﬁed for all groups: goodness-of-ﬁt statistics are not reliable.
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